Well, that didn't last long, did it? I mean the hope that Egypt, sans Mubarak, would transition peacefully, and quickly, to some sort of sustainable liberal democracy. There may indeed be meaningful change, but it seems that the military is firmly in command:
CAIRO — Tens of thousands of protesters returned Friday to Tahrir Square, the site of demonstrations that led to the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak two weeks ago, to keep up the pressure on Egypt's military-led transitional government.
But by early Saturday, the military made it clear there would be limits to further dissent as soldiers and plainclothes security officers moved into the square, beating protesters and tearing down their tents, witnesses said.
In a day that had begun with equal parts carnival and anti-government demonstration, protesters' called for the quick cancellation of the Emergency Law, which for three decades has allowed detentions without trial, and the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, a former air force general appointed by Mr. Mubarak days before he stepped down.
But after night fell, the protest transformed into a tense standoff between protesters and the military, whose neutrality during the uprising, and unwillingness to fire on the protesters, had turned them into popular heroes.
The military may have been "popular heroes," for a short time (and perhaps understandably so), but it's not like it's really an engine of change, let alone to a new chapter in Egyptian history that would see its power (and economic status) reduced. The military was the one significant institution that Mubarak allowed to remain in place during his rule, and it used its position to acquire enormous power within the structure of Mubarak's authoritarianism, or perhaps despite of it, with an enormous stake in Egypt's economy. (For more on this, see Fred Kaplan's recent piece at Slate on the Egyptian military.)
And, indeed, it may not have fired on the protesters -- and been willing to appear to side with them, giving it enormous credibility in terms of public opinion both at home and abroad (and most importantly with the U.S., where many top Egyptian military officials were trained) -- not because it agreed with them but because it was quietly encouraging the end of Mubarak's regime so that it could take over. As Ellis Goldberg wrote at Foreign Affairs a couple of weeks ago:
Earlier that day, the Supreme Military Council released a statement -- labeled its "first" communiqué -- that stated that the military would ensure a peaceful transition of Mubarak out of office. In practice, it appears that power has passed into the hands of the armed forces. This act was the latest in the military's creep from applauded bystander to steering force in this month's protests in Egypt. Since the protest movement first took shape on January 25, the military has, with infinite patience, extended and deepened its physical control of the area around Tahrir Square (the focal point of the protests) with concrete barriers, large steel plates, and rolls of razor wire. In itself, the military's growing footprint was the next act in a slow-motion coup -- a return of the army from indirect to direct control -- the groundwork for which was laid in 1952.
And so the threat to a democratic future for Egypt isn't Islamism but military rule:
The West may be worried that the crisis will bring democracy too quickly to Egypt and empower the Muslim Brotherhood. But the real concern is that the regime will only shed its corrupt civilians, leaving its military component as the only player left standing. Indeed, when General Omar Suleiman, the recently appointed vice president to whom Mubarak entrusted presidential powers last night, threatened on February 9 that the Egyptian people must choose between either the current regime or a military coup, he only increased the sense that the country was being held hostage.
It's no longer being held hostage. The military has taken over.
In the past, the U.S. and others have forged alliances with military dictators all around the world, mostly as a supposed bulwark against communism but also because of a general distrust, if not outright opposition to, democratic movements whose outcomes are unclear. The same has happened more recently, with the U.S. backing dictators as a bulwark against Islamism (or, rather, the threat of jihadism), including in Central Asia and the Middle East.
Given what happened in Egypt this month, with the world's attention focused on the courageous protesters in Tahrir Square and with all the celebrations and talk of democracy that accompanied Mubarak's resignation, it remains to be seen whether the revived military authoritarianism in Egypt will be welcomed by the U.S. -- and whether it will be allowed to get away with this coup -- or whether there will be continued pressure for lasting change beyond this supposed "transition."
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