Guest post by Ali Ezzatyar
Ali Ezzatyar is a journalist and American attorney practising in Paris, France.
(Ed. note: This is Ali's third guest post at The Reaction. Earlier this month, he wrote a post on dictatorship in Tunisia and Egypt. In January 2010, he co-wrote a post on Iran with Bryan Tollin. -- MJWS)
Started with the match of a Tunisian who aspired for more, a revolutionary wildfire burns near and far from his resting place. We have already witnessed one of most incredible and unlikely geopolitical shuffles in modern history; still, as this post goes out, Libya's people stand potentially days away from deposing yet another of the world's dictators against all odds. In addition to these being revolutionary times, these are also perception-changing times. Perceptions of peoples and their aptitude for modernity, surely. But most importantly for America, perceptions of the role the rest of the world is going to play in facilitating that modernity.
With the benefit of hindsight, U.S. foreign policy has sometimes been good and sometimes bad. With respect to the Middle East and North Africa, it is probably not controversial to say it has been almost certainly bad. Leaving aside the reality that the majority of the world sees the U.S. as being totally self-interested, we have also managed to sacrifice the stability of those same interests we are thought to be hoarding so maliciously. In every country, we get a D either in terms of the humanity of our policies or the protection of our interests; in many cases, we get a D in both.
I know a bit about Iran, so let's take that example: We went from organizing a coup d'état that ousted a democratically-elected leader in the '50s to supporting Iraq in an invasion against its new popularly-chosen (but in-flux) government in the '80s. This served to bring in and harden the influence of the most extreme elements in Tehran, who still rule that country today, with the price tag of 1.5 million lives. Less than two decades later, we went in and got rid of the two largest threats to Iran's border while it watched and picked off young American soldiers like fish in a barrel, establishing its influence. In the end, we secured neither its respect nor its oil, nor that of its neighbor, while the whole region watched. Henry Kissinger's famous quote on the Iran-Iraq war was that its too bad "they both can't lose". The reality is, they did both lose -- but so did we, in terms of interests and reputation, perhaps the only two factors that matter in international affairs.
In an era of mass transformation, where the world and the region are once again watching, the U.S. has an unprecedented platform to show that it will, at the very least, stand by its ideals. Undoubtedly, perceptions are being formed today about America's propensity to be a constructive player that will follow the U.S. for decades. America may never have this opportunity again.
Now, President Obama's change moniker is without doubt composed partially of hot air. Whether by chance or design, though, the last month has been very kind to the view that some of what he said in his June 2009 Cairo speech was genuine. During the course of revolutionary, albeit unfinished, change in Egypt and Tunisia, the U.S. has walked the tightrope of Middle East policy exceptionally well. That tightrope requires the U.S. to consider its reputation in the region on a case-by-case basis and decide the extent of its action based on any inevitable perception of its involvement, while at the same time being unwilling to sacrifice the ideals of democratic change for peoples who are taking destiny into their own hands.
Whether or not President Obama agrees that the stakes are as outlined above, his policies and his reaction to events suggest he does. Our influence and rhetoric have so far placed the U.S. in a unique position of having encouraged positive change in a region where it is desperate for legitimacy and good-standing (bearing in mind that we not decide how uprisings began or how they will end, but still have a special role to play, for our sake and our reputation). The president explained his choices, confirming that America would place itself on the right side of history while never imitating that it could dictate the outcome of popular will.
So while perceptions are important and good, and affect our interests, what about the interests themselves? The peaceful toppling of these entrenched despots also gives America the opportunity to align those interests with the values it cherishes for its own people. In addition to begetting a positive circle of goodwill that is more likely to serve our physical interests than the shortsighted policy of yesteryears, it also sets the alternative of extremism on its head. No burning U.S. flags in Cairo or Tunis, only cautious thanks for America among a valiant population happy to have friends in high places.
The U.S. has never been a strong ally of Libya, and that among other factors makes its treatment of Libya necessarily different. With the handwriting on the wall in Tripoli, and the work almost done, the U.S. needs to exercise all of its influence to ensure Qaddafi's departure. This means proposing sanctions (largely symbolic) and publicly considering the idea of no-fly zones to prevent the incursion of foreign mercenaries. President Obama needs to speak up and act with intent -- not least because Libya, the region, and the world are watching.
Ali Ezzatyar is a journalist and American attorney practising in Paris, France.
(Ed. note: This is Ali's third guest post at The Reaction. Earlier this month, he wrote a post on dictatorship in Tunisia and Egypt. In January 2010, he co-wrote a post on Iran with Bryan Tollin. -- MJWS)
Started with the match of a Tunisian who aspired for more, a revolutionary wildfire burns near and far from his resting place. We have already witnessed one of most incredible and unlikely geopolitical shuffles in modern history; still, as this post goes out, Libya's people stand potentially days away from deposing yet another of the world's dictators against all odds. In addition to these being revolutionary times, these are also perception-changing times. Perceptions of peoples and their aptitude for modernity, surely. But most importantly for America, perceptions of the role the rest of the world is going to play in facilitating that modernity.
With the benefit of hindsight, U.S. foreign policy has sometimes been good and sometimes bad. With respect to the Middle East and North Africa, it is probably not controversial to say it has been almost certainly bad. Leaving aside the reality that the majority of the world sees the U.S. as being totally self-interested, we have also managed to sacrifice the stability of those same interests we are thought to be hoarding so maliciously. In every country, we get a D either in terms of the humanity of our policies or the protection of our interests; in many cases, we get a D in both.
I know a bit about Iran, so let's take that example: We went from organizing a coup d'état that ousted a democratically-elected leader in the '50s to supporting Iraq in an invasion against its new popularly-chosen (but in-flux) government in the '80s. This served to bring in and harden the influence of the most extreme elements in Tehran, who still rule that country today, with the price tag of 1.5 million lives. Less than two decades later, we went in and got rid of the two largest threats to Iran's border while it watched and picked off young American soldiers like fish in a barrel, establishing its influence. In the end, we secured neither its respect nor its oil, nor that of its neighbor, while the whole region watched. Henry Kissinger's famous quote on the Iran-Iraq war was that its too bad "they both can't lose". The reality is, they did both lose -- but so did we, in terms of interests and reputation, perhaps the only two factors that matter in international affairs.
In an era of mass transformation, where the world and the region are once again watching, the U.S. has an unprecedented platform to show that it will, at the very least, stand by its ideals. Undoubtedly, perceptions are being formed today about America's propensity to be a constructive player that will follow the U.S. for decades. America may never have this opportunity again.
Now, President Obama's change moniker is without doubt composed partially of hot air. Whether by chance or design, though, the last month has been very kind to the view that some of what he said in his June 2009 Cairo speech was genuine. During the course of revolutionary, albeit unfinished, change in Egypt and Tunisia, the U.S. has walked the tightrope of Middle East policy exceptionally well. That tightrope requires the U.S. to consider its reputation in the region on a case-by-case basis and decide the extent of its action based on any inevitable perception of its involvement, while at the same time being unwilling to sacrifice the ideals of democratic change for peoples who are taking destiny into their own hands.
Whether or not President Obama agrees that the stakes are as outlined above, his policies and his reaction to events suggest he does. Our influence and rhetoric have so far placed the U.S. in a unique position of having encouraged positive change in a region where it is desperate for legitimacy and good-standing (bearing in mind that we not decide how uprisings began or how they will end, but still have a special role to play, for our sake and our reputation). The president explained his choices, confirming that America would place itself on the right side of history while never imitating that it could dictate the outcome of popular will.
So while perceptions are important and good, and affect our interests, what about the interests themselves? The peaceful toppling of these entrenched despots also gives America the opportunity to align those interests with the values it cherishes for its own people. In addition to begetting a positive circle of goodwill that is more likely to serve our physical interests than the shortsighted policy of yesteryears, it also sets the alternative of extremism on its head. No burning U.S. flags in Cairo or Tunis, only cautious thanks for America among a valiant population happy to have friends in high places.
The U.S. has never been a strong ally of Libya, and that among other factors makes its treatment of Libya necessarily different. With the handwriting on the wall in Tripoli, and the work almost done, the U.S. needs to exercise all of its influence to ensure Qaddafi's departure. This means proposing sanctions (largely symbolic) and publicly considering the idea of no-fly zones to prevent the incursion of foreign mercenaries. President Obama needs to speak up and act with intent -- not least because Libya, the region, and the world are watching.
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