An overarching backdrop

By Carl 

The Teabagger-infused acrimony over things domestic has implications beyond our borders. Perhaps this is by design: 

In one swoop, Britain has recognized Libya's rebel government, expelled the remaining London diplomatic staff of the Tripoli-based regime, and freed up millions in assets that can now be funneled to the cash-strapped rebel troops.

Amid a weeks-long stalemate, diplomatic activity seems to have stepped up. This is likely partially because Ramadan begins next week, which will force NATO forces to scale down the fighting as most of Libya begins the month-long daily fast. The US and France have already recognized the rebel government.

"This decision reflects the national transitional council's increasing legitimacy, competence and success in reaching out to Libyans across the country," Foreign Secretary William Hague said Wednesday, according to the Guardian. 

As the title of the article states, the U.K. is really taking the lead on the withdrawal from Libya.

I'm not sure how I feel about this. It's true, the U.S. participation in this NATO exercise has been about as non-existent as a sasquatch (which is real, by the way), and again, my suspicion is that's by design on the part of the Teabaggers.

Three wars, even with one on a limited scale like Libya and one in a draw-down phase like Iraq, is three wars too many for a peacenik like me and two wars too many for an armed force to fight. So it's a good thing the Teabaggers have played the role of Shadow Ministry for Commiepinkohippiefags this time around. I'm glad for that.

And House Weaker Boehner has grasped the Prime Minister for War Opponents like it was a goose for Christmas dinner, rattling the President's cage over the War Powers Act violations, and essentially going nowhere with that tactic. Again, failure is an option for the GOP. Me likey.

It worries me, too. All this fussin' and fightin' over debt limits and War Powers Acts and birth certificates and Messicans has created one overarching backdrop against which any President for the foreseeable future (but in particular, Scary Black Man) will have to contend. The fucking loons of the right wing have managed to turn the once-great America into a joke.

I'm not sure when it started. I mean, you can go all the way back to Joe McCarthy, I suppose. Certainly, Barry Goldwater is worth a look. Ronald Reagan, too.

But somewhere along the thread here, the American right morphed from a set of reasonable people with radical goals into a set of radical asshats with goals best left to Robert Heinlein novels.

In some regards, they fulfill one of the last remaining holes in my theory that Republicans run about a generation behind Democrats.

It goes like this: What Democrats endured as a party in the '60s and '70s, the Republicans only began to experience in the '90s and '00s. And now in the Teens. Party divisions? Democrats saw those flourish in the aftermath of Watergate when it looked like Democrats could maintain a permanent Democratic majority in perpetuity, and everyone wanted a piece of the prize and the squabbling allowed a stealth conservative movement the opportunity to undermine the good works and progress done to that point.

A gradual loss of relevance as a political party, turning into massive jokes during some Presidential campaigns? Look no further than the 1984 Reagan re-election for Dems. Look no further than the 2008 McCain/Palin campaign for the GOP.

A wresting of the party's center with a jerk to the wing? The Dems in 1968. The Republicans in... well, I'd say 1994, but Newt Gingrich's "revolution" looks moderate and centrist by comparison to today's kamikaze. 

All these growing pains -- and we must keep in mind that we are but a stranger in a strange land still, this novel experiment in democracy -- have taken our focus away from what was our purview for decades: our place in international affairs.

Some see this as a good thing and I might concur, but it's the way that we went about it that troubles me. We didn't gracefully exit the world stage, as President Obama put it in his address on Afghanistan, for "nation-building at home." We were dragged away like a mother in a supermarket trying to placate a panicked and tired toddler who demands attention. Or at the very least, candy.

(Cross-posted to Simply Left Behind.)

The Arab Spring midterm

Guest post by Ali Ezzatyar 

Ali Ezzatyar is a journalist and American attorney practising in Paris, France.

(Ed. note: This is Ali's fifth guest post at The Reaction. Last month, he wrote on Obama's foreign policy and the secular uprisings in the Middle East. In February, he wrote on dictatorship in Tunisia and Egypt and on the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. In January 2010, he co-wrote a post on Iran with Bryan Tollin. -- MJWS)

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It's test-time. The durability of an unpopular dictator, Arab or otherwise, has been called into question since January. Fair enough. But each bud of the Arab Spring has taught us another thing or two.

Tunisia taught us that an aura of inevitability bolstered by rhetoric from abroad could do little to help against galvanized, anti-governmental will. Egypt confirmed that Tunisia was not a fluke, with the additional lesson that years of foreign support and patronage can do little to hold a dictator and his system in place. On the flip side, Algeria is showing us how years of civil war can make a population complacent to revolution. They all demonstrate how the information age has changed politics forever. So if precedental value is important, how do we interpret Libya and Syria?

First, tribal and sectarian allegiances are obstinate, even in the face of destiny.

In February, it looked inevitable that Qaddafi would be the third dictator deposed in so many months. As the so-called Libyan rebels swallowed up government territory on their way to Tripoli, few could have predicted the stalemate that has set in today. The reality is that Qaddafi's counter-punch was engineered through a consolidation of tribal loyalties in and around Tripoli, not a regrouping of government arms. With the rebels faltering, many of Libya's tribal leaders (who have long had a "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" relationship with Qaddafi) rallied around the colonel. They have now succeeded in keeping him in power. Similarly, what we are seeing in Syria is the hardening of the core of Alavi patrons that make up the regime, with the Assad family as their figurehead. The Alavi minority, since coming to power in the mid 1960s, has been the primary power broker in that country. It stands to lose significantly more than any one group in Tunisia or Egypt ever could.

Second, an absence of meaningful diplomatic ties to world's most powerful countries actually hardens regimes and their power.

One could as easily conclude that pariah-status endangers dictators, alienating their populations and driving them to resentment. In Egypt and Tunisia, however, it was the relationships the dictatorial regimes had with democratic countries that allowed the world to exercise influence when it counted. Libya and Syria are regimes that are accountable to almost no one, whose dictators (and respective entourages) are not welcome anywhere. There is nobody to apply pressure or give incentives; the regime is left to fend for its life in the wake of rebellion. What's more, populations in isolated countries probably resent the rest of the world almost as much as they do their own regimes, which has implications for intervention of any kind.

Still, if the world had reacted to help the rebels when even the most loyal to Qaddafi would have bet against him, things could be different there today. Similarly, in countries like Syria (and Iran for that matter), there is probably much less today to the argument that isolation, with tools like sanctions and fiery rhetoric, makes for productive long-term foreign policy. A more rigorous diplomatic project in these places could have set the stage for regime change. Alas, what's done is done.

Partially on account of these lessons, one would imagine that if the regime does fall in Syria, its implications would have a particular thrust. It is the most entrenched, perhaps the most brutal, and almost certainly the most domestically popular of the large Arab dictatorships. Regime change there would usher in a certain inevitability that would echo from Riyadh to Rabat; it could mean the death knell of the Arab dictator as we know it.

Sure, this is conjecture for now. But, hey, this is just the midterm.

Russia's position on Libya: Trying to have it both ways

Guest post by Dmitry Gorenburg

Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior analyst at CNA's Center for Strategic Studies, the editor of the journal Russian Politics & Law, and an associate at Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. From 2005 to 2010, he served as Executive Director of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS). He has taught in the Department of Government at Harvard University and has served as a consultant on Russian military and security issues for various agencies of the U.S. government and on ethnic and minority issues for the European Center for Minority Issues. In addition, he writes the blog Russian Military Reform.

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The Russian Government surprised many observers by going along with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized international enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya. Russia was initially expected to veto the resolution. Instead, Russia chose to abstain in order to ensure the protection of civilians, while its ambassador to the United Nations made statements expressing concern about how the resolution would be implemented.

In recent years, Russia has had close trade relations with the Libyan Government. In particular, it has signed billions of dollars worth of arms contracts with the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. This is the context that partially explains the removal of Vladimir Chamov, Russia's ambassador to Libya, after he sent a telegram to Moscow arguing that allowing the U.N. resolution to pass would represent a betrayal of Russia's state interests. Chamov has since returned to Moscow, where he has publicly spoken out against the implementation of the no-fly zone.

Soon after the vote, Russia's attitude toward the no-fly zone unexpectedly became a factor in Russian domestic politics. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's statement on March 21 criticized the U.N. for getting involved in an internal conflict. In the most controversial part of his remarks, Putin argued that the resolution allowed international forces to take virtually any measures against a sovereign state, and in this he said it resembled medieval calls to crusades, "when someone called on others to go to a certain place and liberate it."

The response from President Dmitry Medvedev was almost immediate. He argued that Russia's abstention on the resolution vote was the proper position. Furthermore, he dressed down Putin (though not by name) by saying, "[u]nder no circumstances is it acceptable to use expressions that essentially lead to a clash of civilizations, such as 'crusades' and so on. It is unacceptable. Otherwise, everything may end up much worse than what is going on now. Everyone should remember that." And he removed Chamov from his position, essentially for public insubordination. Putin came out the next day with a statement indicating that the president is responsible for foreign policy in Russia and that he backed his president's policies. A spokesman indicated that Putin's previous statement was simply an indication of his own personal views rather than an official policy statement.

It may be that this conflict was yet another example of the good cop-bad cop show that the Russian leadership tandem has been putting on for the last three years. Or it may be that this is the first serious indication that Medvedev and Putin are engaged in a serious behind-the-scenes tussle for the right to run for president in 2012.

Why do Russian politicians see this conflict the way they do? Their inconsistent positions on Libya are essentially a case of wanting to have their cake and eat it too. Russian leaders decided not to veto Resolution 1973 for two reasons. First, they did not want to alienate Western leaders who were pushing for the intervention. While the rapprochement with the United States is important to them and certainly played a role here, we should also remember the importance of Russian political and economic ties with European states, and especially France and Italy, both of whom were strongly in favor of a no-fly zone because of the potential for a humanitarian and refugee disaster in the event of an attack by Qaddafi's forces on Benghazi. Second, Russian leaders did not want to be blamed for blocking the intervention if the result was a large-scale massacre of civilians.

On the other hand, Russian leaders also did not want to create a new norm of international intervention in internal conflicts, particularly when these conflicts were the result of a popular uprising against an authoritarian ruler. They genuinely dislike what they see as a Western predilection for imposing their values and forms of government on other parts of the world. They remember the color revolutions in Serbia, the Ukraine, and Georgia, in which friendly regimes were replaced by ones that were to a greater or lesser extent anti-Russian.

Furthermore, they believe that these popular protest movements were organized and funded by Western governments, particularly the United States. This creates a certain amount of suspicion of similar protests leading to the removal of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, even when the deposed rulers do not have particularly close ties to Russia.

So Russian leaders are understandably nervous about the coalition's rather expansive interpretation of Resolution 1973. They were willing to allow for the establishment of a no-fly zone in order to avert a likely massacre of civilians and to help their European partners avoid a flood of refugees on their soil. They are much less willing to see NATO forces provide military assistance to a popular uprising against an authoritarian ruler that it has traditionally supported.

If this conflict drags on, Russian leaders will increasingly begin to speak out against the military campaign. They will be especially concerned if it becomes increasingly clear that NATO air strikes are targeting Qaddafi's ground forces rather than limiting themselves to preventing Libyan air forces from targeting civilian areas.

Elephant Dung #24: Rand Paul slams Gingrich and Fox News over Libya

Tracking the GOP Civil War

By Michael J.W. Stickings

(For an explanation of this ongoing series, see here. For previous entries, see here.)

Via Think Progress, the radical libertarian senator from Kentucky took swipes at both Newt Gingrich and Fox News at Wednesday's Congressional Correspondents Dinner: 

I was happy to see that Newt Gingrich has staked out a position on the war, a position, or two, or maybe three. I don't know. I think he has more war positions than he's had wives.

And:

There's a big debate over there. Fox News can't decide, what do they love more, bombing the Middle East or bashing the president? It's like I was over there and there was an anchor going, they were pleading, can't we do both? Can't we bomb the Middle East and bash the president at the same time? How are we going to make this work?

I rarely (i.e., never) do this, but allow me to put my hands together for Sen. Paul. Those are some truly biting comments. The one about Gingrich is not just on the mark but hilarious. And the one about Fox News gets it exactly right, the tension not just at Fox News but among Republicans generally (with some exceptions).

Was he just trying to be funny? Maybe. (You can see a wry smile after the Gingrich line.) But he knew what he was doing, and he knew just how to twist the knife.

Nicely done.

Craziest Republican of the Day: Louis Gohmert

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Republicans love their anti-Obama conspiracy theories, but Rep. Louis "terror babies" Gohmert (R-Tex.), one of the craziest around, was able to kick it up a notch on Wednesday by linking health-care reform to the current intervention in Libya:

It's a bad bill. And then when you find out that the prior Congress not only passed that 2,800 page bill with all kinds of things in it, including a new president's commissioned officer corps and non-commissioned officer corps. Do we really need that? I wondered when I read that in the bill. But then when you find out we're being sent to Libya to use our treasure and American lives there, maybe there's intention to so deplete the military that we're going to need that presidential reserve officer commissioned corps and non-commissioned corps that the president can call up on a moment's notice involuntarily, according to the Obamacare bill.

Umm... what? I realize that Republicans aren't quite sure what to do about Libya -- they generally support military intervention of any kind but also oppose anything Obama does, making it tricky -- but this is stupid even by their standards.

Suggesting that Obama is using Libya to unleash some private presidential army on America? That's insane. As Media Matters explains (you know, because it has the facts at hand):

Despite the claims in right-wing chainemails, the health care law did not give Obama some sort of "private army."The legislation did create the ReadyReserve Corps, a new component of the U.S. Public Health ServiceCommissioned Corps, but there was nothing nefarious about it. The purpose ofthe Ready Reserve Corps is simply to make the Public Health Service -- whichpreviously "did not have a reserve component to call upon" in times of crisis -- better prepared to respond to emergencies.

As FactCheck.org noted after thebill passed, "Thetruth about the new Ready Reserve Corps is a lot less interesting than theconspiracy theories." But of course, Gohmert has always been more interestedin conspiracytheories thanthe truth.

Gohmert and so many others in the Republican Party, which continues its descent into madness without so much as a glimmer of hope.

(image -- along with more craziness from Gohmert)

Libya is not Iraq. Liberal interventionism is not neoconservatism.

By Michael J.W. Stickings

One of our former contributors, Jim Arkedis, has an excellent piece up at Foreign Policy responding to the assertion, notably by Stephen Walt, that neoconservatism and liberal interventionism are essentially the same, and that the intervention in Libya is essentially the same as the invasion of Iraq.

If you've read this blog recently, you'll know that I side with Jim on this -- and that I'm a liberal interventionist who supports the intervention in Libya (albeit with reservations). Indeed, I argued yesterday that the "war" in Libya is decidedly not a neocon war.

I encourage you to read Jim's piece. (Instead of calling them (or us) liberal interventionists or liberal hawks, he uses "progressive internationalists." My sense is that "internationalism" is too broad, but it suggests that war is an option but not the preferred option, as it would seem to be for the neocons, so it's not a bad term to use.) Here's a taste:

Progressive internationalists recognize that U.S. foreign policy is now aholistic enterprise that must first summon all sources of national power todeal with what goes on within states as well as between them -- direct andmultilateral diplomacy, development aid to build infrastructure and civilsociety, trade to promote growth, intelligence collection, and law enforcement,to name a few -- and only then turn to force as the final guarantor of peaceand stability.

Neocons, however, disdain multilateral diplomacy and overestimate theefficacy of military force. Their lopsided preoccupation with "hard power"creates an imposing facade of strength, but in fact saps the economic,political, and moral sources of American influence. By overspending on themilitary and allowing the other levers of American power to atrophy, neoconsmisallocate precious U.S.national resources in two ways -- leaving the UnitedStates with too little of the "smart power" capacitiesdesperately needed in war zones like Afghanistan and an overabundanceof "hard power" capacities it will never use. The trick is to carefullycultivate both, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State HillaryClinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen havechampioned since Obama took power.

I think that's right, and I said much the same thing, if less elaborately, yesterday:

Libya isn't a neocon war. It isn't about American hegemony, American unilateral aggression, or American national self-interest (say, in terms of oil). It's a "war," or whatever you want to call it, sanctioned by the U.N. and the Arab League, that is, a war not waged by a U.S.-led "coalition of the willing" alienating even close allies but a war effectively waged by the international community. And it is largely a humanitarian war, a war to protect innocent civilians from being slaughtered and to provide cover to rebels seeking to bring down one of the must ruthless dictators in the world.

[Bill] Kristol may be cheering it on, but it isn't his war, and in fact it is a war that is decidedly the antithesis of what he generally purports to support. It's up to him to support it or not, of course, but the success of this war, and he does think "we will" win, would only mean a further defeat for neocon ideology, the refutation of all that he stands for.

It is essential, I think, that we not let all military intervention be understood in neocon terms and that those of us who support intervention, usually as a last resort in extreme cases, defend the principles that guide us from the attacks of those who would lump all intervention, and all war, together. 

Instead of being driven by the reckless pursuit of global American hegemony, after all, nor even by a purely realist sense of national self-interest, we are motivated by internationalism and humanitarianism. And, to me, there's something fundamentally noble about that.

The Squirmish in Libya

By Michael J.W. Stickings

You might have seen Jon Stewart make fun of this last night. It certainly belongs among Sarah Palin's "greatest" hits.

American acceptionalism

By Carl 

(Pun intended.) 

So here's President Obama, talking about America's role in the world last night:

For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and advocate for human freedom. To allow a slaughter in Benghazi would have been to "brush aside America's responsibility as a leader and... would have been a betrayal of who we are.

For ten years, we've been endlessly reminded of America's "special" place in world affairs. America is the world's biggest economy, has the world's biggest armed forces, is the policeman to the world... yet can't hunt down one skinny sick Saudi in a small region that straddles the border of two of the most desolate regions in the world.

Even the strongest have limitations.

Now, none of this is to say that America shouldn't throw its weight around when necessary, and Obama alluded to this last night in the negative:

We must always measure our interests against the need for action.

Again, fair enough. When our interests are at stake, we ought to be prepared to take measures to protect ourselves.

But what threat does Qaddafi pose to us? After all, he voluntarily shut down his nuclear program (although given the level of interest the Bush administration had in him, and their effectiveness in addressing terrorism, one has to wonder if indeed this ever happened) and cozied up to the previous administration. No one has claimed that he has had aspirations against us, and if anything, he's presented a face of reconciliation for Africa, offering his aid to the situations in Somalia, Darfur, and Zimbabwe.

Again, there's no judging his sincerity on these, either.

The slaughter in Benghazi is certainly a legitimate concern of Obama's, and the world's, and it was nice that Obama put on the veneer of legitimacy by asking for the U.N.'s blessings on this mission, and did so without sending his secretary of state in to do a snake-oil presentation complete with vials of white powder. Too, Qaddafi suffers from his own world image, one that seemingly did not endear him to any of the Security Council who could have vetoed the action (China and Russia abstained).

Of particular interest to me, however, was the curious lack of invitation to powers-to-be to assist in patrolling the world now. Nations like China, Brazil, and India, with their steaming-hot economies and massive expansion of trade and influence, are living off our military dime. It's about time they started ponying up. China has a strongly vested interest in North and Central Africa. Brazil certainly by dint of its location will look to Africa as a trade partner, and India with its billions of people must have some eye on Africa and its enormous resources and access to Europe and the Americas.

So the question I want to ask Mr. Obama is, Why not China? Why not India? Why not Brazil? I accept that it had to be us in the past, but why now? Have we gotten so locked into the old Cold War thinking that, if America doesn't do it, this will not hold? That it will turn socialist/Islamist/terrorist without American intervention?

It's a new century. You're a new-age man. Surely it's time to think outside of the box.

(Cross-posted to Simply Left Behind.)

Obama, Kristol, Libya: The new American military doctrine

By Michael J.W. Stickings

It troubles me greatly that I'm on the same side as Bill Kristol with respect to the Libyan intervention, as I've generally come around to supporting it (with severe reservations). As Kristol writes:

The president was unapologetic, freedom-agenda-embracing, and didn't shrink from defending the use of force or from appealing to American values and interests. Furthermore, the president seems to understand we have to win in Libya.

But of course Libya isn't a neocon war. It isn't about American hegemony, American unilateral aggression, or American national self-interest (say, in terms of oil). It's a "war," or whatever you want to call it, sanctioned by the U.N. and the Arab League, that is, a war not waged by a U.S.-led "coalition of the willing" alienating even close allies but a war effectively waged by the international community. And it is largely a humanitarian war, a war to protect innocent civilians from being slaughtered and to provide cover to rebels seeking to bring down one of the must ruthless dictators in the world.

Kristol may be cheering it on, but it isn't his war, and in fact it is a war that is decidedly the antithesis of what he generally purports to support. It's up to him to support it or not, of course, but the success of this war, and he does think "we will" win, would only mean a further defeat for neocon ideology, the refutation of all that he stands for.

Yes, okay, he supposedly stands for "freedom," but does he really? Yes, to a point, but what he really stands for is American imperial univeralism, for the imposition of American values or more specifically neocon values on the rest of world at the point of a sword.

For all the reservations we may have about the intervention in Libya, this is not that -- Libya is not Iraq, nor is it what the neocons want generally, which is for the U.S. to act according to its narrow interests even in direct opposition to the international community. Thankfully, Obama thinks differently:

"We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world," Obama said in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington.

"It was not in our national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen."

Obama articulated a broader – if not easily explained — vision of U.S. involvement in future actions, reserving the right to act in the nation's "interests and values" and arguing that Americans "should not be afraid to act." But he also cautioned against unilateral action that would result in bloody, protracted conflict and pronounced the country's days as the world's police force to be over.

He added:

It is true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what's right.

In this particular country – Libya; at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale... To brush aside America's responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.

As president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.

I would disagree with one point: The U.S. is not as exceptional as Obama suggests. A lot of countries do not "turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries," and not intervening in Libya does not mean approving of such atrocities.

Otherwise, though, I think he's right -- and was right to act. And is right to be ushering in a new era of military intervention that rejects neocon unilateralism in the pursuit of global hegemony on the one side and pacifism on the other.

War is not a desirable option, but it is unfortunately a necessary one in some circumstances. And, in this case, it has been redefined and taken away from those on the right who have used it to advance their own interests, and who have destroyed America's standing in the world as a force for good.

Maybe this is the Obama Doctrine: a careful balance of self-interest and capacity on one side and the need to act for humanitarian reasons on the other. Whatever it is, it's certainly an improvement on what came before it, and, in Libya, where there has been significant success so far, it would appear to be taking shape.

Success in Libya (cont'd)

By Michael J.W. Stickings

We may still not know quite what the objectives of the "war" are, nor how far the allies are willing to go, but there's no denying that the intervention thus far has proven to be successful in preventing mass murder and providing the rebels with the cover they need to fight back against Qaddafi's mercenaries:

American and European bombs battered Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's most important bastion of support in his tribal homeland of Surt on Sunday night, as rebels seeking his ouster capitalized on the damage from the Western airstrikes to erase their recent losses and return to the city’s doorstep.

Their swift return, recapturing two important oil refineries and a strategic port within 20 hours, set the stage for a battle in Surt that could help decide the war. 

No, nothing has been "won" yet, and there is still much that could go wrong. But would we really want the opposite to have happened -- Qaddafi crushing the rebels, slaughtering innocent and helpless civilians, and reinstating his tyrannical rule with an iron fist?

(And, no, this doesn't mean the U.S. now has to go into, say, Syria. It's quite possible to treat the need for, and justification of, military intervention on a case-by-case basis. In this sense, bombing Burma makes little sense but using diplomacy to try to get India and China to put pressure on that country's military junta could help a great deal. Bombing Iran would likely be a disaster, but working with the international community to apply sanctions could work if not to bring down the regime at least to force it to reconsider it's objectives.)

I quoted him recently and I'll quote him again. Here's Juan Cole:

I am unabashedly cheering the liberation movement on, and glad that the UNSC-authorized intervention has saved them from being crushed. I can still remember when I was a teenager how disappointed I was that Soviet tanks were allowed to put down the Prague Spring and extirpate socialism with a human face. Our multilateral world has more spaces in it for successful change and defiance of totalitarianism than did the old bipolar world of the Cold War, where the US and the USSR often deferred to each other's sphere of influence...

Some have charged that the Libya action has a Neoconservative political odor. But the Neoconservatives hate the United Nations and wanted to destroy it. They went to war on Iraq despite the lack of UNSC authorization, in a way that clearly contravened the UN Charter... The Libya action, in contrast, observes all the norms of international law and multilateral consultation that the Neoconservatives despise...

The intervention in Libya was done in a legal way. It was provoked by a vote of the Arab League, including the newly liberated Egyptian and Tunisian governments. It was urged by a United Nations Security Council resolution, the gold standard for military intervention...

Many are crying hypocrisy, citing other places an intervention could be staged or worrying that Libya sets a precedent. I don't find those arguments persuasive. Military intervention is always selective, depending on a constellation of political will, military ability, international legitimacy and practical constraints. The humanitarian situation in Libya was fairly unique. You had a set of tank brigades willing to attack dissidents, and responsible for thousands of casualties and with the prospect of more thousands to come, where aerial intervention by the world community could make a quick and effective difference.

These are just some of the highlight's of Cole's "open letter to the left on Libya." Whatever your views of the intervention, you should read it in its entirety.

Truth in Comics

By Creature


If it's Sunday, it's Truth in Comics.

Success in Libya

By Michael J.W. Stickings

I'm still wrestling with the military intervention in Libya. I don't fully support it, mainly because I'm still not sure what the longer-term objectives are, but at the same time I'm not against it, and in fact, if I had to choose, I'd say I support it despite my very serious concerns and reservations.

And, yes, that's because I believe that sometimes war can be an effective instrument of peace. Is there inconsistency in that there is intervention in Libya but not in, say, Bahrain or Yemen? Sure. Is there a possibility of "mission creep"? Of course.

But I suppose the arguments in favour of intervention outweigh the arguments against it. Specifically, there were, and remain, significant humanitarian reasons to act.

And not being able to intervene everywhere, and not being willing to intervene in places with similar problems, isn't an argument against not intervening anywhere. We have to pick and choose. And it seems to me that the right choice was made with respect to Libya -- which, let us not forget, was not made by the U.S. alone but by an international alliance and, perhaps most importantly, the Arab League. And it is not the U.S. leading the intervention but NATO. And Libyans, other than Qaddafi and his thugs, seem to be welcoming it. As the NYT's Nicholas Kristof, hardly a warmonger, reports:

This may be a first for the Arab world: An American airman who bailed out over Libya was rescued from his hiding place in a sheep pen by villagers who hugged him, served him juice and thanked him effusively for bombing their country.

Even though some villagers were hit by American shrapnel, one gamely told an Associated Press reporter that he bore no grudges. Then, on Wednesday in Benghazi, the major city in eastern Libya whose streets would almost certainly be running with blood now if it weren't for the American-led military intervention, residents held a "thank you rally." They wanted to express gratitude to coalition forces for helping save their lives.

Doubts are reverberating across America about the military intervention in Libya. Those questions are legitimate, and the uncertainties are huge. But let's not forget that a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted for now and that this intervention looks much less like the 2003 invasion of Iraq than the successful 1991 gulf war to rescue Kuwait from Iraqi military occupation.

This is also one of the few times in history when outside forces have intervened militarily to save the lives of citizens from their government. More commonly, we wring our hands for years as victims are massacred, and then, when it is too late, earnestly declare: "Never again."

Yes, American troops were welcomed in Iraq, too, before things went horribly wrong. But Libya is not Iraq and this intervention is not that war. Could it become something like that? Yes, perhaps. But there are always risks. In the wake of the Iraq War and Occupation, should the military never be used this way? Is any and all intervention wrong?

Yes, I know. What about not just Bahrain but, say, Burma and North Korea? Well, again, we have to be realistic about when and where intervention for humanitarian purposes can succeed, as well as when and where an international coalition can be put together. Sometimes other measures are called for, like sanctions. I do not support military intervention in Iran, for example, which would likely be a disaster. But sometimes, just sometimes, you need to use force. With Qaddafi threatening mass murder of his own people, at a time of historic pro-democracy movements throughout the Middle East, this would appear to be one of those times.

And, so far, there has been significant success. Check out Juan Cole's list of the top ten accomplishments of the U.N. no-fly zone, which concludes:

The liberation movement at the moment likely controls about half of Libya's population, as long as Misrata and Zintan do not fall. It also likely controls about half of the petroleum facilities. If Benghazi can retake Brega and Ra's Lanouf and Zawiya, Qaddafi soon won't have gasoline for his tanks or money to pay his mercenaries. Pundits who want this whole thing to be over with in 7 days are being frankly silly. Those who worry about it going on forever are being unrealistic. Those who forget or cannot see the humanitarian achievements already accomplished are being willfully blind.

I appreciate the very persuasive arguments against this intervention and I respect many of those making them, including the likes of Glenn Greenwald and many Democrats in Congress. I wouldn't go so far as to say that they're being "willfully blind." In the end, they may be proven right. But we don't know how this will end, and, as of right now, even without a sense of what the longer-term objectives are, it is undeniable that a great deal has been achieved, much to the credit of those who have taken the risk to intervene with force.

Is Libya the antidote to Iraq Syndrome?

By Nicholas Wilbur

When President Obama announced on March 18, 2011, that he would deploy the United States military in order to enforce a United Nations resolution, there was little doubt that the intervention on behalf of the Libyan people was not solely dedicated to their protection, even if that was the primary justification for the mission.

Nobody's jaw dropped when Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) told MSNBC three days later, "We are in Libya because of oil."

With the Arab world in chaos, anxieties over the future of oil production spiked gasoline prices by 20 percent in a matter of weeks. On par with the economy and the unemployment rate, gas prices determine elections. Unfortunately, high gas prices do not justify military intervention. Luckily, the potential for mass murder does.

The American people already have abandoned their aversion to yet another military endeavor, mainly because the administration and the media have joined forces to reassure the public that Libya is not an invasion, a war, or an occupation. 

Unlike "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, which was an eye-for-an-eye assault on the elusive mastermind behind Sept. 11, 2001, and unlike "Operation Iraqi Freedom," which was sold to the American people based on false pretenses and hyped fears of mushroom clouds over major U.S. cities and weapons of mass destruction – and an invasion/war/occupation orchestrated by a millionaire oil company CEO who also happened to be the vice president, no less – Libya, conversely, has the potential to become the antidote to "Iraq Syndrome," an engagement that not only unifies the American public but that also reverses the reputation of the United States as a war-mongering, war-profiteering world police force.

The Libya intervention is not only a "just" mission, it is also "just" a mission. The president has promised both America and the international community that no ground troops will be deployed. 

In Afghanistan, there was an evil terrorist roaming around the hills laughing about his attacks on the World Trade Center. In Iraq there were (allegedly) chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

In Libya there is a dictator, Muammar al-Qaddafi, who has authorized aerial bombings of his own cities and deployed the army to hunt down and kill civilian rebels unsupportive of his regime. "Any Libyan" who "undermines the sovereignty of the state," who commits crimes against the army, or who opposes his reign "will be punished by death," Qaddafi said.

"We will show no mercy and no pity to them," he warned.

This "mission" is a political win-win for President Obama. However involved, however bloody, however defined by historians, the first phase of bombing the military facilities of a dictator is sure to give Obama a boost in the polls.

Beyond quelling fears of ever-higher gas prices, the use of military force against a world enemy has the potential to erase the image of Obama as a weak leader and an inexperienced and incapable commander in chief.

By framing the engagement as a humanitarian relief effort aimed at protecting the civilian rebels being targeted, incarcerated, and murdered by Qaddafi's troops, the administration can win the hearts of both the pro-military conservatives and the foreign policy isolationists on the left.

Conservatives are easy. They love a good fight against a bad guy, and Qaddafi is about as bad as it gets (worse, or at least on par with, Saddam Hussein). What's the point in having the greatest military on earth – and spending more on defense than every other developed country combined – if you don't flex a little military muscle every now and then? Furthermore, if we justified the dethroning of Saddam, Qaddafi, given his latest antics, should be no question.

Obama's announcement of military force in Libya:

"Let me be clear. These terms are not negotiable.

These terms are not subject to negotiation.

If Qaddafi does not comply with the resolution,

the international community will impose consequences.

The resolution will be enforced through military action."

Many liberals, on the other hand, prefer that America keep to herself. But they have a weakness for peace missions. With the support of France and Britain, the United States – by far the most militarily equipped for the initial strikes on key air force facilities – is leading the surge. But the intention is to turn the mission over to NATO, which would brand the intervention not as another U.S. war but as a unified international coalition fighting as one in order to ensure peace and democracy in the Arab world. By promising that no U.S. ground forces will be deployed, Obama has tried to turn the hearts of his own base. By employing the rhetoric of past commanders in chief – the "reluctance" to use military force, the pursuit of peace, the refusal of a dictator to agree to the terms of resolution drafted by an international coalition – Obama has earned a nod of approval from the entire world.  

As for the apolitical majority of American citizens, strong rhetoric about the coalition, about the humanitarian crisis, and about the potential of mass graves come second, third and fourth, respectively, to the bottom line. If gasoline prices fall in America because of the U.S. military's involvement in Libya, the ends will justify the means.

If Obama is lucky, historians will document the "mission" in Libya through a lens that focuses not on the political intentions or the casualties it caused, but on the national and international support it garnered.

_______________________________________________________

The broad masses of a population are more amenable to the appeal of rhetoric than to any other force.

All great movements are popular movements. They are the volcanic eruptions of human passions and emotions, stirred into activity by the ruthless Goddess of Distress or by the torch of the spoken word cast into the midst of the people.

 – Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf –

• Libya poll: 70% of Americans back no-fly zone resolution in Libya, CNN poll finds – L.A. Times

• "No time for doubters" – The Economist

(Cross-posted at Muddy Politics.)

On Libya, Obama can do no right by the right

By Michael J.W. Stickings

I'm still on the fence over the intervention in Libya, though I'm leaning more towards support than opposition. (Yes, I'm still something of a liberal interventionist, despite Iraq, despite Afghanistan.)

But I genuinely feel for Obama, who finds himself in a no-win situation politically -- unless everything breaks perfectly, which is highly unlikely. He's facing not just criticism from the left but calls for impeachment. And while the right, Republicans and the like, is generally supportive of intervention, nothing Obama does will ever be good enough, and we're already being bombarded with criticism that Obama isn't doing enough and took too long to make a decision. What is being responsible (or at least cautious and deliberative) to most of us is being weak to warmongers in the neocon circle. None of this is at all surprising -- partisanship? never! -- but it shows just how challenging it will be for the president to benefit from this, or even just to break even.

Andrew Sullivan, who thus far been a skeptic of intervention, exposes some of the conservative nonsense that is currently making the rounds, from the likes of Sarah Palin, Newt Gingrich, Max Boot, and Hugh Hewitt, yet also acknowledges, against such criticism, that the intervention has already, to a key point, succeeded:

President Obama -- calm, judicious, even-tempered President Obama -- jumped into this lose-lose mess in one Tuesday meeting. And the most significant gain -- avoiding a massacre in Benghazi -- has already been achieved.

This is not to say that the rest of the military effort will go well. There are still so many questions, and there is still so much uncertainty, not least with respect to the allies' longer-term objectives, and so much that could go horribly wrong. But the conservative criticism, with the possible exception of calls from the likes of John Boehner for Obama to explain the intervention more clearly, is simply comic in its ideological superficiality. Conservatives are either advancing their dangerous, and failed, agenda (they still have an awful lot of blood on their hands) or trying to score cheap political points, or both.

It will certainly be difficult to Obama to come out of this looking good, but so far... well, so good.

To support the military intervention in Libya or not?

By Michael J.W. Stickings

I'm not sure what to do about Libya. I'm generally a liberal interventionist, though less of one after the Iraq War, and I do think that some humanitarian crises demand military action. But is the situation in Libya a humanitarian crisis? Or is there otherwise a good reason to intervene? Do we intervene just because we don't like Qaddafi? Or because he's an easier target than other dictators? And if in Libya, why not elsewhere -- say, in Bahrain, or North Korea?

Questions, questions, questions. As Fred Kaplan asked (and as I blogged about last week):

What is the desired goal of this action? Is it to pressure Qaddafi to stand down? Is it to provide air cover to the rebels, so they can fight Qaddafi's ground forces on more equal footing? Whatever the goal, if the no-fly zone doesn't get us there, should we try other means? And if not, why not? As Clausewitz wrote, war is politics by other means. War is fought for a political objective. If that objective is important enough to justify one form of military intervention, why not another form? What is the goal? How far are you willing to go to accomplish the goal? How important is the goal?

Is there even a goal, or we just taking this one step at a time? With Iraq and Afghanistan fresh in our memories (and with the latter war still ongoing, and not well), should we not have a better sense of what the hell we're doing? And of what the cost is going to be, or, rather, of what cost we can expect, both in human and monetary terms? (What can we expect? What are we willing to put up with?)

Regardless, I do generally support the current military effort, not least because it is not a unilateral effort but an international one with the British and French taking lead roles. The Iraq War in particular soured our appreciation for military intervention of any kind, and perhaps rightly so, but ask yourself this: Do you not want Qaddafi removed from power? Do you not think we should be not just expressing our support for the Libyan opposition but, given that Qaddafi has the power to crush it but actively supporting its efforts? Sure, there is inconsistency here. Again, we're intervening in Libya but not in North Korea, a far more horrendous state. But there will never be consistency. Almost by definition, military intervention must be ad hoc. And not intervening in North Korea, or even in Bahrain, does not mean that all intervention is thereby illegitimate.

But now let me disagree with myself. Will any good actually come of this intervention? Perhaps not, given how messy the situation is. As Josh Marshall writes, making a strong case against intervention:

No clear national or even humanitarian interest for military intervention. Intervening well past the point where our intervention can have a decisive effect. And finally, intervening under circumstances in which the reviled autocrat seems to hold the strategic initiative against us. This all strikes me as a very bad footing to go in on.

And this doesn't even get us to this being the third concurrent war in a Muslim nation and the second in an Arab one. Or the fact that the controversial baggage from those two wars we carry into this one, taking ownership of it, introducing a layer of 'The West versus lands of Islam' drama to this basically domestic situation and giving Qaddafi himself or perhaps one of his sons the ability to actually start mobilization some public or international opinion against us.

I just don't know. Even if the intentions are good, there is just so much that could go badly here. And yet, isn't that always the risk? Given our bipolar partisan political culture, we're all expected to pick a side. I'm just not sure I can. I'm for doing something, and something relatively aggressive, but I'm just not sure this is it.

I'm sorry I'm not more decisive, but it concerns me that people are being decisive without any good reason to be other than ideological inclination or pure partisanship.

But if the intervention in Libya may well be a no-win situation, what is clear is that for Obama it doesn't matter what he does, he will be severely criticized. Politically, it's an almost absolute no-win situation for him, and the only way he comes out of it looking good is it the intervention somehow succeeds without much consequential damage, which seems unlikely. The allies may be targeting Qaddafi and his forces, but at home it's Obama who's the target, and he's taking it from all sides:

-- On the left, Ralph Nader thinks Obama should be impeached for war crimes. In the House, Democrats are questioning the legality of the attacks. Dennis Kucinich is even talking impeachment.

-- On the right, John McCain, to whom the media always turn on military matters (because he apparently still has credibility), supports Obama (more or less) but thinks he waited too long to act. Richard Lugar, a devout realist, thinks we could be in for endless humanitarian war. And John Boehner wants Obama to explain U.S. objectives more clearly.

Actually, let me quote Boehner:

Before any further military commitments are made, the administration must do a better job of communicating to the American people and to Congress about our mission in Libya and how it will be achieved.

You know what? That makes sense. I'm usually extremely critical of Boehner (and of the party he leads), but Obama should indeed explain himself, and this action, to the American people. After Iraq and Afghanistan, if not generally, they deserve no less.

And it would help because while the intervention isn't unilateral, and while British and French leadership gives the U.S. some cover, the action isn't going over all that well in the Arab world:

The Arab League secretary general, Amr Moussa, deplored the broad scope of the U.S.-European bombing campaign in Libya and said Sunday that he would call a league meeting to reconsider Arab approval of the Western military intervention.

The last thing the U.S. needs is opposition from Arab and other Muslim states. The intervention must be seen, and must be, not just a U.S.-European effort to remove an undesirable leader but a broad international effort to support an oppressed people. Even if the allies don't have ulterior motives (oil, for example), the perception of a Western attack on yet another Muslim state, and an attempt to control that state, must be avoided. And it's understandable why many in the Muslim world might perceive this to be precisely that.

Obama has explained himself, but not sufficiently. And that, in part, is why I'm still on the fence, and I suspect why many others are as well. Yes, the U.S. was right to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo. Yes, it is shameful that the international community ignored Rwanda. Yes, there is good reason to seek Qaddafi's ouster and to free Libya from the shackles of tyranny. But... but... but... we're living in the shadow of the misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we're right to be skeptical.

Needless to say, now that it's started I hope the intervention goes well. But we need a much clearer sense of the objectives than we have now, and we need to know how far our leaders are willing to do. Until then, we must remain vigilant in our criticism.

Unblogging

By Michael J.W. Stickings 

I'm sorry there's been nothing new from me the past couple of days. I've had to deal with some other priorities that unfortunately have prevented me from blogging.

Thankfully, there have been, as usual, some great posts from my co-bloggers.

I hope to be back at it later today.

In the meantime, I'll just note that the U.N. has approved military action against Libya. This would obviously be far preferable to, say, unilateral U.S. action. I consider myself something of a liberal interventionist, and I could be persuaded to support such action here, but, needless to say, serious questions remain.

I would also note -- though I'm sure you're paying attention to this -- that the situation in Japan continues to be, well, bad. And apparently getting worse. (I've spent some time the past couple of days reading up on nuclear power. We all think we know something about it, but of course most of us don't really know how it works. For a quick overview, both on how nuclear reactors work and what happens during a meltdown, I'd recommend this slideshow.)

Bill Kristol pushes for war with Libya, but there are more sensible alternatives

By Michael J.W. Stickings

Bill Kristol -- and this should hardly come as a surprise to anyone -- is pushing for war with Libya, arguing, like a broken record, that a no-fly zone wouldn't be enough and that the U.S. should "take out [Qaddafi's] ships in the Mediterranean" and "take out tanks and artillery," but more sober minds are, understandably, rather more hesitant to intervene so recklessly.

At Slate the other day, for example, Fred Kaplan asked all the right questions:

But let's say Obama was fine with taking the risk, assuring the nation and the world that he wouldn't fall into the escalation trap—that he'd order U.S. fighter planes in the area (an air base in Italy, an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean) to enforce a no-fly zone and go no further. There would still be some things to figure out. For instance: How much of Libya do you want to restrict? (All of it? Just the Mediterranean coastal area? Just the eastern territories?) What are the rules of engagement? (Do we shoot down all aircraft that enter the zone, fixed-wing and helicopters? What if a Libyan pilot fires back? Do we destroy their air defenses ahead of time or just when they turn on their radar? If Qaddafi's planes keep flying, do we bomb his runways? If the planes are down but Qaddafi sends in tanks, do we bomb their tanks?) Will other nations send their planes, too, or just their blessings, if that? How long do you want to keep this up?

These questions, and many more, have to be answered before the military can even begin to plan a campaign.

But even before any of these questions can be asked, there's a more basic question still: What is the desired goal of this action? Is it to pressure Qaddafi to stand down? Is it to provide air cover to the rebels, so they can fight Qaddafi's ground forces on more equal footing? Whatever the goal, if the no-fly zone doesn't get us there, should we try other means? And if not, why not? As Clausewitz wrote, war is politics by other means. War is fought for a political objective. If that objective is important enough to justify one form of military intervention, why not another form? What is the goal? How far are you willing to go to accomplish the goal? How important is the goal?

And at The Washington Note, Steve Clemons expressed concerns over a possible no-fly zone:

In short, a no-fly zone is a high cost, low return strategy that doesn't necessarily create a military tipping point in favor of the Libyan opposition. Gaddafi is at war with his own people, and it's natural and important to try and protect and help unarmed protesters and innocent victims -- but a no-fly zone may harm the situation more than help.

If the US and NATO impose a no-fly zone, it gives Gaddafi a frame he thrives in: Libya against what he calls the imperialistic and neo-colonial interventions of evil America and the West. Last week at the TED 2011 meeting in Long Beach, Al Jazeera Director General Wadah Khanfar underscored the significance that the protests shaking the entire Middle East were occurring without the clutter and distraction and potential delegitimization of foreign intervention.

This is important. A no-fly zone changes what appears on TV and changes the entire frame. What is happening in the Middle East will instantly become about what the West will do and won't do -- rather than on what the citizens who have had enough are doing for themselves.

I still believe we should help and there are ways to do so without a large military footprint.

Among these and perhaps most importantly is sharing real time intelligence with the Opposition, from targeting to what Gaddafi's movements are. Stop the flow of mercenary goons into the country. Consider a blockade. Perhaps look at facilitating third countries helping to re-arm and supply the military stocks of the Opposition with no US weapons visibility -- which will only stoke the conspiracy theories that run rampant that the US has become Messianically obsessed with regime change and will tilt outcomes in directions it wants rather than what the public is calling for.

Send food, water, shelter and medical supplies to support those in need -- on the borders with Egypt & Tunisia -- as well as inside Libya.

Knee jerking wildly as usual, Kristol doesn't seem to be considering the situation with that sort of considered perspective. Ultimately, yes, the goal may very well be regime change -- i.e., something other than Qaddafi, though Kristol obviously want that "something" to have his stamp of neocon approval -- but the question is how to get there without making the situation worse and without the U.S. sinking into yet another quagmire. Kaplan's questions need to be answered satisfactorily before any military intervention should be started, but, before that even, other alternatives, such as the ones Clemons mentions, should be pursued.

This isn't about being soft on Qaddafi. He is indeed a "monster... at war with his own people," as Clemons says, and we (those of us in the West but also those in the Arab world) do need to try to "stop him from slaughtering people as he moves east across the country," as Kristol argues. But, again, heavy-handed military intervention -- and perhaps even unilateral intervention, or yet another military misadventure in a part of the world that isn't exactly sympathetic to American objectives and the imposition of American power -- hardly seems to be the answer.