As the neocon Commentary (or is it Dysentery?) is (gleefully) reporting, Haim Saban, a major Democratic donor, "has indicated that he will not contribute to President Obama's reelection campaign in 2012, because of the administration's stance on Israel":
"President Obama has raised so much money and will raise so much money through the Internet, more than anybody before him. And he frankly doesn't, I believe, need any of my donations," said Saban.
"I'm very perplexed as to why the president, who's been to Cairo, to Saudi Arabia, to Turkey, has not made a stop in Israel and spoken to the Israeli people," he continued. "I believe that the president can clarify to the Israeli people what his positions are on Israel and calm them down. Because they are not calm right now."
He's probably right that Obama doesn't need his financial support, but what does he object to, that Obama hasn't visited Israel? Okay, fine, he should go to Israel sometime, but the real issue is that Obama refuses to play along with the right-wing pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., that is, to kowtow before Netanyahu and Likud, and their American allies, who seek "peace" only on terms that penalize the Palestinians and otherwise keep them in a state of submission before an enlarged Israeli state that keeps the land it has come to occupy.
Again, all the president said in his speech last week was that Israel's pre-1967 borders should be taken as a starting point for negotiations. That's it, but it was enough to enrage Netanyahu and others on the right and to turn Congress into a bunch of shameless weaklings applauding Israel's, and the Israeli lobby's, demands.
Obama deserves criticism, perhaps, for not doing enough to work for a settled peace between Israel and the Palestinians, but his position is clearly aimed at securing such a peace by acknowledging that concessions are required on both sides. Of course, Netanyahu and his allies, both in Israel and the U.S., refuse to make any concessions, or at least the sort of concessions that could actually bring about peace, which is why they are obstacles to peace regardless of whatever dishonest rhetoric they may spew.
If there is to be any progress in the region, and any long-term security for Israel, it is essential that extremist ideology of all kind be rejected in favour of a more realistic understanding of what it may take to reach a compromise that, while not necessarily perfect, will be acceptable for the most part to both sides. It's too bad Saban doesn't seem to get that.
His beard is long and grey; he is reputed for living a rather simple life, but Israel's prime minister recently called him the greatest threat to the world. He is the Supreme Leader of Iran. As attention remains focused on Abbottabad, Iran's nuclear program continues nearby. Some are hoping that news from Damascus to Fukushima will influence events in Iran, as it fades from foreign policy's short memory. But the mullahs, and Iran's people for that matter, couldn't care less about what happens elsewhere. Now more than ever, to encourage change in the Islamic Republic, incentivized diplomacy is necessary before it's too late.
It is almost mechanical to group Iran with neighboring Arab countries, what with its share of Islamic extremism and oil. But social behavior in Iran is driven by a totally different mindset, and it won't be seeing revolution soon. For better or worse, Iranians feel a deep-rooted disassociation with the rest of the region.
An extension of its social mindset, Iranian politics is significantly different from that of its neighbors. The Iranian government, while autocratic, has traditionally been more democratic than most of the regimes around it. More importantly, the Islamic Republic is itself the product of revolution, making it more established and deeply rooted than any Arab government in the Middle East. While a week of protests in Tahrir square brought about revolutionary dominos in Egypt, weeks of uprisings in 2009 did not beget a single meaningful policy change in Iran.
And in perhaps the same way the massive protests of 2009 did not register a blip on the Arab world's radar, the Arab Spring has done and will do little to motivate Iranians, people and politicians alike. Iranians simply do not perceive countries like Egypt and Syria as trendsetters.
A proud, isolated country, Iran is stubborn about its policy, often to its own detriment. Years of debilitating sanctions demonstrate how far Iran is willing to go to preserve what it views as its sovereignty. So while much of Iran sits in a notoriously busy earthquake zone, and its nuclear plants are reportedly malfunctioning, it has recently announced that it is not apprehensive after events in Fukushima. Even the world's most established nuclear powers are rethinking their energy strategies. Yet another table for one at the Iranian gala.
The international community has long been worried that Iran would build a nuclear bomb and use it. That was never very likely. Now its neighbors are voicing concern that an earthquake in Bushehr (or elsewhere) could have similar catastrophic effects in the region. That is actually significantly more likely.
Consider that Iran today is a stable regime in a region of turmoil. It pulls strings in Afghanistan and Iraq, is buoyed by high oil prices, and has not been dissuaded from its nuclear program. What does all of this mean?
It means the Islamic Republic will continue to play by its own rules, and will only be influenced by incentives. Regime change is not likely in the short term, so the world needs to engage Iran's current government no matter how unpleasant that is. Given Iran's sensitivity to what it perceives as foreign interference, premising this engagement on an improved human rights record is unfortunately untenable.
President Obama's election platform of speaking to America's enemies, Iran being at the top of that list, was promising. Gradually, however, the crown jewel of foreign policy projects has all but slipped off the agenda.
Progress on Iran's nuclear program can be achieved with more carrots and direct diplomacy (Iran's freezing of uranium enrichment in 2004 demonstrates this is possible). There is an added bonus to such a project as well. Since only conservatives in Iran have the legitimacy to make compromise with Iran's enemies, they are likely to move toward the center of the political spectrum while doing so. The byproduct of diplomacy could be further political liberalization and even democratization. Change in Iran needs a jump start. A rigorous diplomatic project is imperative at this juncture.
The BBC reports on the outburst of violence by Assad's brutal regime:
At least 72 protesters have been killed by security forces in Syria, rights groups say -- the highest reported death toll in five weeks of unrest there.
Demonstrators were shot, witnesses say, as thousands rallied across the country, a day after a decades-long state of emergency was lifted.
Many deaths reportedly occurred in a village near Deraa in the south, and in a suburb of the capital, Damascus.
US President Barack Obama called for a halt to the "outrageous" violence.
"This outrageous use of violence to quell protests must come to an end now," the president said in a statement.
UK Foreign Secretary William Hague said he was "extremely concerned" by reports of deaths and casualties across Syria and urged restraint on the country's authorities.
"Political reforms should be brought forward and implemented without delay," he said. "The Emergency Law should be lifted in practice, not just in word."
That would be a start, but I just don't see that happening anytime soon. Syria isn't Egypt, where the military wanted Mubarak out after his position become untenable, and which in any event is more westernized than Syria.
Just consider what's happened: Assad lifted the state of emergency, essentially encouraging more protests, and then responded by murdering demonstrators critical of his regime.
Obama and Hague and other world leaders can say all they want. What are they actually going to do about the situation in Syria? Likely, nothing. Nothing beyond saying the right things, which is something but certainly not nearly enough. (Although Aljazeera reports that U.S. has been supporting/funding the Syrian opposition.)
The demonstrators are largely on their own, I fear. And they likely won't get far.
Here's an Aljazeera report on the protests and crackdown:
It's test-time. The durability of an unpopular dictator, Arab or otherwise, has been called into question since January. Fair enough. But each bud of the Arab Spring has taught us another thing or two.
Tunisia taught us that an aura of inevitability bolstered by rhetoric from abroad could do little to help against galvanized, anti-governmental will. Egypt confirmed that Tunisia was not a fluke, with the additional lesson that years of foreign support and patronage can do little to hold a dictator and his system in place. On the flip side, Algeria is showing us how years of civil war can make a population complacent to revolution. They all demonstrate how the information age has changed politics forever. So if precedental value is important, how do we interpret Libya and Syria?
First, tribal and sectarian allegiances are obstinate, even in the face of destiny.
In February, it looked inevitable that Qaddafi would be the third dictator deposed in so many months. As the so-called Libyan rebels swallowed up government territory on their way to Tripoli, few could have predicted the stalemate that has set in today. The reality is that Qaddafi's counter-punch was engineered through a consolidation of tribal loyalties in and around Tripoli, not a regrouping of government arms. With the rebels faltering, many of Libya's tribal leaders (who have long had a "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" relationship with Qaddafi) rallied around the colonel. They have now succeeded in keeping him in power. Similarly, what we are seeing in Syria is the hardening of the core of Alavi patrons that make up the regime, with the Assad family as their figurehead. The Alavi minority, since coming to power in the mid 1960s, has been the primary power broker in that country. It stands to lose significantly more than any one group in Tunisia or Egypt ever could.
Second, an absence of meaningful diplomatic ties to world's most powerful countries actually hardens regimes and their power.
One could as easily conclude that pariah-status endangers dictators, alienating their populations and driving them to resentment. In Egypt and Tunisia, however, it was the relationships the dictatorial regimes had with democratic countries that allowed the world to exercise influence when it counted. Libya and Syria are regimes that are accountable to almost no one, whose dictators (and respective entourages) are not welcome anywhere. There is nobody to apply pressure or give incentives; the regime is left to fend for its life in the wake of rebellion. What's more, populations in isolated countries probably resent the rest of the world almost as much as they do their own regimes, which has implications for intervention of any kind.
Still, if the world had reacted to help the rebels when even the most loyal to Qaddafi would have bet against him, things could be different there today. Similarly, in countries like Syria (and Iran for that matter), there is probably much less today to the argument that isolation, with tools like sanctions and fiery rhetoric, makes for productive long-term foreign policy. A more rigorous diplomatic project in these places could have set the stage for regime change. Alas, what's done is done.
Partially on account of these lessons, one would imagine that if the regime does fall in Syria, its implications would have a particular thrust. It is the most entrenched, perhaps the most brutal, and almost certainly the most domestically popular of the large Arab dictatorships. Regime change there would usher in a certain inevitability that would echo from Riyadh to Rabat; it could mean the death knell of the Arab dictator as we know it.
Sure, this is conjecture for now. But, hey, this is just the midterm.
Started with the match of a Tunisian who aspired for more, a revolutionary wildfire burns near and far from his resting place. We have already witnessed one of most incredible and unlikely geopolitical shuffles in modern history; still, as this post goes out, Libya's people stand potentially days away from deposing yet another of the world's dictators against all odds. In addition to these being revolutionary times, these are also perception-changing times. Perceptions of peoples and their aptitude for modernity, surely. But most importantly for America, perceptions of the role the rest of the world is going to play in facilitating that modernity.
With the benefit of hindsight, U.S. foreign policy has sometimes been good and sometimes bad. With respect to the Middle East and North Africa, it is probably not controversial to say it has been almost certainly bad. Leaving aside the reality that the majority of the world sees the U.S. as being totally self-interested, we have also managed to sacrifice the stability of those same interests we are thought to be hoarding so maliciously. In every country, we get a D either in terms of the humanity of our policies or the protection of our interests; in many cases, we get a D in both.
I know a bit about Iran, so let's take that example: We went from organizing a coup d'état that ousted a democratically-elected leader in the '50s to supporting Iraq in an invasion against its new popularly-chosen (but in-flux) government in the '80s. This served to bring in and harden the influence of the most extreme elements in Tehran, who still rule that country today, with the price tag of 1.5 million lives. Less than two decades later, we went in and got rid of the two largest threats to Iran's border while it watched and picked off young American soldiers like fish in a barrel, establishing its influence. In the end, we secured neither its respect nor its oil, nor that of its neighbor, while the whole region watched. Henry Kissinger's famous quote on the Iran-Iraq war was that its too bad "they both can't lose". The reality is, they did both lose -- but so did we, in terms of interests and reputation, perhaps the only two factors that matter in international affairs.
In an era of mass transformation, where the world and the region are once again watching, the U.S. has an unprecedented platform to show that it will, at the very least, stand by its ideals. Undoubtedly, perceptions are being formed today about America's propensity to be a constructive player that will follow the U.S. for decades. America may never have this opportunity again.
Now, President Obama's change moniker is without doubt composed partially of hot air. Whether by chance or design, though, the last month has been very kind to the view that some of what he said in his June 2009 Cairo speech was genuine. During the course of revolutionary, albeit unfinished, change in Egypt and Tunisia, the U.S. has walked the tightrope of Middle East policy exceptionally well. That tightrope requires the U.S. to consider its reputation in the region on a case-by-case basis and decide the extent of its action based on any inevitable perception of its involvement, while at the same time being unwilling to sacrifice the ideals of democratic change for peoples who are taking destiny into their own hands.
Whether or not President Obama agrees that the stakes are as outlined above, his policies and his reaction to events suggest he does. Our influence and rhetoric have so far placed the U.S. in a unique position of having encouraged positive change in a region where it is desperate for legitimacy and good-standing (bearing in mind that we not decide how uprisings began or how they will end, but still have a special role to play, for our sake and our reputation). The president explained his choices, confirming that America would place itself on the right side of history while never imitating that it could dictate the outcome of popular will.
So while perceptions are important and good, and affect our interests, what about the interests themselves? The peaceful toppling of these entrenched despots also gives America the opportunity to align those interests with the values it cherishes for its own people. In addition to begetting a positive circle of goodwill that is more likely to serve our physical interests than the shortsighted policy of yesteryears, it also sets the alternative of extremism on its head. No burning U.S. flags in Cairo or Tunis, only cautious thanks for America among a valiant population happy to have friends in high places.
The U.S. has never been a strong ally of Libya, and that among other factors makes its treatment of Libya necessarily different. With the handwriting on the wall in Tripoli, and the work almost done, the U.S. needs to exercise all of its influence to ensure Qaddafi's departure. This means proposing sanctions (largely symbolic) and publicly considering the idea of no-fly zones to prevent the incursion of foreign mercenaries. President Obama needs to speak up and act with intent -- not least because Libya, the region, and the world are watching.
UPDATE (11:06 pm) According to Aljazeera and The Guardian, the protests have spread to Tripoli. In Benghazi, a military unit has allegedly joined the protesters. And Gaddafi's son is warning of imminent civil war. The crackdown continues, but all the Gaddafi regime has is brute force. It's the protesters who have justice, and the righteousness of a noble cause, on their side.
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Updating my post from yesterday, the Libyan "government" (and I put that in quotes because Gaddafi's regime is really just an oppressive tyranny) continues to crack down on opposition demonstrations, even targeting funerals.
Libyan security forces opened fire again Sunday on residents of Benghazi as they attended a funeral procession for the dozens of protesters killed there the day before, and quickly crushed three smaller uprisings in working-class suburbs of the capital, Tripoli.
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The escalating violence in Benghazi, Libya's second-largest city and the center of the protests, appeared to mark a decisive turn in the protests that have shaken Libya, a North African nation rich in oil.
The shooting at the funeral, where the number of casualties could not immediately be confirmed, reinforced what seems to have become a deadly cycle in a city where thousands have gathered in antigovernment demonstrations: security forces fire on funeral marches, killing more protesters, creating more funerals.
As I wrote yesterday, while there appears to be a certain domino effect going on, with anti-regime protests in one country picking up on protests elsewhere, it's not like this will be an easy transition to liberal democracy. What has happened in Egypt, where it's still not clear what will happen under military rule, or in Bahrain, where there is reason for optimism, may not be replicated elsewhere, including in Libya. These regimes are responding in vastly different ways to efforts to overthrow them, and some, like Gaddafi's, are apparently resorting to extreme violence to thwart them.
Just consider how long it took Europe to throw off the yoke of tyranny and oppression, albeit long before the days of Facebook and Twitter, and even then much of Europe was under authoritarian fascist rule even towards the end of the last century. We must stand behind the courageous men and women who are standing up against the regimes that for decades (if not centuries, in terms of social and political oppression) are kept them down, but we cannot expect meaningful change overnight.
I am encouraged by what I am seeing, by the reports I am reading, but I realize that it's going to take a long time, during which much blood will be spilled, before liberty, democracy, and human rights triumph in places where they have few, if any, roots. It is inspiring, though, what we are witnessing, and for once there is hope for a better future.
Look, a few of these, and I think with a little diplomacy and a lot of patience, we might see a peaceful resolution that enhances stability, in the short-term at any rate. What this kind of instability does is makes US foreign policy become a hodgepodge, because not only are these nations troublesome, but any tinpot dictator worth his salt, like Muammar Qaddafi, is going to start rattling sabres, looking to cut a deal with the US that will blow up in our faces eventually like Saddam Hussein did.
I think President Obama has done an extremely good job so far handling the situation in Egypt, walking the fine line between supporting Mubarak, a close U.S. ally in the region, and embracing Mohamed ElBaradei and the admirable reform movement that has taken to the streets. Yes, of course, I know that the U.S. has supported an authoritarian regime, that the U.S. has helped prop up Mubarak over the years, that oppression has been central to the perpetuation of that regime, but the situation isn't black-and-white, the forces of liberty struggling against a tyrannical foe, and the U.S. needs to be careful, not least because the outcome of the uprising isn't yet known.
Now, I agree with ElBaradei that the U.S. needs to "let go of Mubarak," and certainly the U.S., and Obama in particular, can't be seen as pro-Mubarak in the event Mubarak's regime falls. Alternatively, the U.S. can't be seen as explicitly pro-reform if reform turns out to be Islamist rule, as in Iran after the 1979 revolution, or, generally, something unstable and in opposition to U.S. interests in the region, or if Mubarak ends up staying in power. That's just how it works. It's called being realistic. You need to keep your options open.
I'm hardly an expert on Egyptian politics, but it doesn't appear to me, from what I can tell, that the country is about to turn into another Iran or, generally, that post-Mubarak Egypt would be fundamentally anti-American. More likely, it would experience the growing pangs of youthful democracy as it transitions away from authoritarianism. Sure, the Muslim Brotherhood would be part of that, in some way, but, contrary to conservative propaganda, it would not necessarily dominate the political landscape and turn the country Islamist. Egypt has a long history of being a secular, modern Muslim state, and there are forces there, ElBaradei among them, who do not want it to move in that direction and who will do everything they can to build a sustainable democratic system.
While Obama is being necessarily cautious, his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, has articulated a significantly more ambitious pro-reform position, and it's one I think should be the main U.S. response to the current crisis:
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Sunday urged Egyptians to take up a national dialogue that would lead to free and fair elections this fall and, while not explicitly distancing the United States from the embattled President Hosni Mubarak, said that the United States stood "ready to help with the kind of transition that will lead to greater political and economic freedom."
She issued a strong endorsement of key groups working to exert their influence on the chaotic Egyptian protests – the military, civil society groups and, perhaps most importantly, the nation's people – but carefully avoided any specific commitment to Mr. Mubarak.
Her phrasing seemed to imply an eventual end to Mr. Mubarak's 30 years in power. But when asked whether the United States was backing away from Mr. Mubarak and whether he could survive the protests, the secretary chose her words carefully. His political future, she said, "is going to be up to the Egyptian people."
Making the rounds of the Sunday television talk shows, Mrs. Clinton urged the government in Cairo to respond in a "clear, unambiguous way" to the people's demands and to do so "immediately" by initiating a national dialogue. At the same time, she was supportive of the Egyptian military, calling it "a respected institution in Egyptian society, and we know they have delicate line to walk."
This is realism with a pro-democratic core. The U.S. has been closely involved with Mubarak, but it cannot now appear to be overly interventionist. And so Clinton is right that while reform is needed, and desirable, the Egyptian people themselves need to be the engine of meaningful change.
Mubarak may very well be done, and I hope he is, but the future is cloudy. The U.S. will have a role to play, and it can help in the transition to "real democracy," but for now it must advance its interests, and its support for reform, with care.
But it can also help not just by calling for a national dialogue but by signalling, as Clinton did, that it stands for something other than realpolitik, that it stands with the reform movement and the people of Egypt, and that it stands by its own principles and ideals.
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You can watch Clinton on ABC's This Weekhere. Here's part of the interview:
